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Gaston Bachelard has been dead since 1962, and yet his ideas remain flexible, in transition. 
Can it be said that his position within discourse is solely that of an historical figure? This 
eccentric and engaging French philosopher remains a changing discursive entity in his 
own right, occupying a position within a long chain of influential and influenced 
philosophy. His ideas change and morph to fit new ideologies, new discursive landscapes 
and new applications. His work, to this day, is present within new and unfolding theories 
touching upon topics that were once of great interest to him. Although his many ideas 
regarding the interpretation of the elements, the poetics of reverie and the imagination 
remain of interest as a part of the history of continental and material philosophy, there are 
other possibilities for engagement that are more ad hoc, more plastic.  
The overall spirit of Bachelard’s poetic projects endures independently of his 
historiographical footprint. Although he was a scholar very much of his own milieu, albeit a 
highly innovative scholar preoccupied with the problems of his day, there are many 
valuable and topical lessons to be learned by placing Bachelard’s work into remediating 
dialogue with philosophical goals beyond his experience or lifetime. The boon of working 
with a philosophy as ambitious, imaginative and polyvalent as Bachelard’s is that it is 
always, continuously, ready for adaptation. He has proven to be extremely 
methodologically useful for a wide variety of topics. 
 A recent edited volume (Gayon–Wunenburger 2000), for example, (Gayon– 
Wunenburger 2000) has demonstrated his diverse and pan-national appeal. There is, it 
appears, a Bachelard for every intellectual tradition and every cultural oeuvre. The first 
decade of the new millennium has seen a veritable smorgasbord of new Bachelardian 
articles that experiment with the myriad and flexible mass of his ideas. These studies focus 
on a broad array of topics, including funerary rites (Pierron 2001), the construction of the 
planned city of Brasília (Oliveira 2001), patriarchal gendering of thought (O’Shea–Meddour 
2003), and post-war modernisation (Lane 2006) to name a few. Perhaps the most fertile 
field in which the Bachelardian seed has sprouted is that of the ecologically inflected 
material philosophy borne from our current environmental crises and anxieties. 
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This article seeks to understand something of the cross-resonance between the 
philosophy of Gaston Bachelard and the materialism of the twenty-first century. Rather 
than seeking to engage with Bachelard within his original context or as a legacy of 
influence, I intend to draw his work into a conversation with recent anglophone materialist 
discourse. My points of engagement are Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things by 
Jane Bennett (2010), and Elemental Philosophy: Earth, Air, Fire and Water as Elemental 
Ideas by David Macauley (2010). Each of these monographs is focused upon a topic that 
was of great interest to Bachelard within his own lifetime – the imagination of matter and 
the philosophy of the elements respectively – and yet each places these topics within 
distinctly twenty-first century frameworks.  
 In the light of the increasing need for formative ecological philosophy in the face of 
manifold environment anxieties and conceptual problems, I will argue that Bachelard has 
acquired, by virtue of potentialities inherent within his ideas and through new 
interpretations, a new relevance much in need of further exposition. Bachelard and his 
corpus of works benefit, to my mind, from being given permission for autopoeis; by 
allowing his ideas to blend and percolate through those developed following his death, 
new Bachelards emerge. Bachelardian ideas infuse twenty-first century new materialisms 
with nuance and life, and so too can the twenty-first century revitalise Bachelard. Rather 
than the ad hoc quotation of Bachelard that has become de rigueur in certain areas of 
literary discourse, I seek to present a new, remediated Bachelardian framework that can 
take its place in discourse. Gaston Bachelard and and as Twenty-First century materialism, 
one might say. One can certainly apprehend the flexibility of matter within philosophy, but 
the goal of this article is to highlight the flexibility of Bachelard in equal measure. The 
argument begins with a comparison of Jane Bennett and Bachelard, followed by a 
discussion of David Macauley and Bachelard. Once the comparison is made, it will then be 
possible to speculate as to what kind of ‘New Bachelards’ emerge from the process of 
comparison. 
 
 
JANE BENNETT AND GASTON BACHELARD: MATERIALE IMAGININGS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Jane Bennett, as a political scientist, brings an ever-present and conscientious 
applicability to the imagination of matter. Reading Vibrant Matter is a politicising act, a call 
to awareness of a vibrant, interconnected world of vital ‘stuff’, the apprehension of which 
forces a reconceptualization of our relationship with that which we had previously 
assumed to be inert. Bennett’s (2010: VII) vibrant materialism, in her words, aims to “think 
slowly” about an idea “that runs fast through modern heads”, namely “the idea of matter as 
passive stuff, as raw, brute, or inert”. Bennett’s ideas have proved to be popular outside of 
the original purview of Vibrant Matter, and it is not an uncomfortable process to relate 
them to those of Bachelard. There are many reasons why the reader of Bennett might wish 
to make a comparison with Bachelard. Reading his writings on material imagination, to this 
day, is a call to consider both the subjective influence and the autonomous aesthetic 
valence of a world in which humanity shapes and is shaped by objects. Bennett takes this 
idea into the twenty-first century, riding the wave of Deleuzian vitalism and Latourian 
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distributed agency into the realm of what is now being referred to in discourse as ‘object-
oriented philosophy’.  
 The implications of Jane Bennett’s Vital Matter for human agency within a materialist 
schema are political and ethical in nature. Bennett advocates the eschewal of the notion 
that all properties of thing-power are ultimately a result of human agency. Delaying the 
critique of objects as constructs of culture and history, she argues, presents an opportunity 
to “render manifest a subsistent world of nonhuman vitality”. This manifestation, once 
apprehended, “arrives through humans but not entirely because of them” (Bennet 2010: 
17). By insisting on the interaction between human and non-human and on the 
unhelpfulness of such binaries as human/non-human, Bennett presents a world of intimate 
liveliness and distributed agency. By dwelling within a world in which matter has affect, 
behaviour, vitality and agency, the us and the it become intertwined. Rather than 
exhibiting “passive intractability”, Bennett’s non-human actors have the ability to produce 
effects, to make things happen (Bennet 2010: 5).  
 Bennett, in this sense, adds an interesting spin to Bachelard. Following Husserl’s 
phenomenological method, Bachelard claims that subject and object are “co-constituted” 
(Hans 1977: 316). To give a fixed, categorical definition to an object would be to deny it 
dynamic force, the flatten the phenomenon. Unlike a metaphor, which refers to something 
real, a poetic image is unreal, or rather irreal (Hans 1977: 317); it is a reaction to the 
phenomenal world. Taxonomic division does not stand within such a model, for the 
creation of imagination requires one to discard the notion that the us of subjectivity and 
the it of objects are a valid distinction. By eschewing the urge to break imagination into a 
system of prescriptive objective rules, Bachelard’s approach instead privileges the power 
of the imagination prior to structural hermeneutics. Picart (1997: 59) describes Bachelard’s 
methodology as “a perpetual play of consciousness that alternately teases out, wrestles 
with, and recedes from the emergence of an image”. The vitality of the object for the 
subject drives Bachelard to understand “the poetic image and its place in human life”. 
Poetics, then, allow a speculation on a source of human inspiration new and powerful to 
the imagination and anterior to interpretation (McAllester Jones 1991: 95). By reducing the 
agency of humans, as Bennett does, we reach a balance between matter as phenomenon 
and as autonomous agent that finds a fit within Bachelard’s approach.  
 On the topic of phenomenology, Bennett makes some methodological observations 
that put Vibrant Matter into further dialogue with the phenomenological methodology of 
Bachelard. Bennett invokes the embodied approach of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as an 
important influence, a step confirming and yet moving on from the Husserlian 
phenomenology of Bachelard. Drawing on the formulation of Diana Coole (2007), Bennett 
(2010: 29–30) proposes a spectrum of agencies spanning human physiological and motor 
processes (the pre-personal and non-cognitive embodied phenomenological experience), 
and the human social structures of an “interworld” (the transpersonal, intersubjective 
processes of phenomenology). Consequently, Bennett’s materialism makes a 
phenomenological claim much like that of Bachelard, albeit predicated on a different 
manifestation of the theory and with different considerations in mind. Bennett presents a 
world in which an ability to feel the vitality of the object, be it with the reason or the body, 
gives the option of a political engagement with the world that avoids deadening or 
flattening objects or reducing nature to utility. Bachelard has much the same goal, albeit in 
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a somewhat disembodied sense. Taken together, we can apprehend a more developed 
Bachelardian notion of the ‘interworld’ of trans-subjective reverie coupled with the recent 
insights gleaned from a turn towards embodiment in phenomenology. 
 Bennett and Bachelard, in very different contexts and by different methods, attempt 
to correct the notion that Bennett (2010: VII) describes as the parsing of the world into 
“dull matter” (the it and the category of things), and “vibrant life” (the us, and the category 
of beings). Bachelard presents the same false dichotomy. For to him “the duality of subject 
and object is iridescent, shimmering, unceasingly active in its inversions” (Bachelard 1997: 
XIX). Bennett proceeds by affirming the inhuman vitality of matter, and Bachelard stresses 
the complete dependence of human imagination on objects. By merging the two, the 
human subject 'emerges' from their solipsism and into engagement with the non-human 
but vital. Compare, for example, these two passages: 
 
Humanity and nonhumanity have always performed an intricate dance with each 
other. There was never a time when human agency was anything other than an 
interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity; today this mingling has become 
harder to ignore. (Bennett 2010: 31). 
 
A dynamic joy touches, moulds and refines [images of matter]. When forms, mere 
perishable forms and vain images–perpetual change of surfaces–are put aside, these 
images of matter are dreamt substantially and intimately. They have weight; they 
constitute a heart. (Bachelard 2006: 1). 
 
Making a step that is highly relevant in comparison with Bachelard, Vibrant Matter 
seeks to shift focus away from “the enhancement to human relational capacities resulting 
from affective catalysts” to the “catalyst itself as it exists in nonhuman bodies” (Bennett 
2010: XII). Breaking away from and simultaneously supporting Bachelard’s ideas, Bennett 
(Bennett 2010: XII) evokes a power that is “not transpersonal or intersubjective but 
impersonal, an affect intrinsic to forms that cannot be imagined (even ideally) as persons”. 
In The Poetics of Space (1994: XVI), Bachelard summarises his position succinctly, claiming 
that “[b]ecause of its novelty and its action, the poetic image has an entity and dynamism 
of its own; it is referable to a direct ontology”. He endeavours to develop a technique for 
capturing the force of an object that is inhuman, and is nevertheless the sine qua non of 
human life. The power of the object could, if reframed, be a kind of impersonal affect of the 
kind described by Bennett.  
 The principal catalytic effect of material imagination, for Bachelard, stems from the 
emergence of images, which through their dynamism, are the ‘adjectives’ rather than the 
‘nouns’ of experience. They qualify, but are not in themselves a subject or an object (Hans: 
317). He proposes a poetic imagery that uncovers the primal qualities of matter, and thus 
has the “feeling” of matter (Hans: 317). The goal of this imagination is “to reestablish 
imagination in its living role as the guide of human life” (Kaplan 1972: 2). One can well 
imagine what language would be without adjectives. It would be inalterably impoverished 
and unable to express even the slightest nuance of quality, gradation or valence. Through 
the qualificatory vocabulary of material imagination however, human experience is 
enriched with the language of things. Thus, to impoverish the autonomy of images is to 
devalue the very currency of the human imagination, words and images. By doing away 
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with the rigidity of material form, we approach a more viscous, more flexible and more 
interconnected mode of materialism. 
 Bennett sets equally high stakes on the preservation of material dynamics. The 
vitality of matter, for Bennett (2010: 23), is predicated upon the Deleuzian notion of the 
assemblage, the alliance of objects into “living, throbbing confederations”. These 
rhizomatic alliances of matter have no head and no edge, a foil for the limitations inherent 
within human-centric theories of action. (Bennet 2010: 24) The consequences of this, she 
claims, has powerful sociopolitical effects: 
 
Why advocate the vitality of matter? Because my hunch is that the image of dead or 
thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying 
fantasies of conquest and consumption. (Bennett 2010: IX). 
 
Bennett (2010: XV) advocates a refusal to demystify or break down the imagination of 
matter, for “demystification tends to screen from view the vitality of matter and to reduce 
political agency to human agency”. Like Bachelard, “[t]he capacity to detect the presence 
of impersonal affect requires that one is caught up in it”. Both philosophers seek to deal in 
effects generated by an engagement with matter that cannot be quantified, and is not 
subject to traditional objective knowledge based epistemologies. Like the 
phenomenology of Bachelard, the vitalism of Bennett has human implications and yet 
non-human origins. There must, in each case, be an unknown alterity of matter, an 
influence. For Bennett (2010: XVI), this requires us to cultivate a deliberate 
anthropomorphism, the notion that “human agency has some echoes in nonhuman 
nature”. This, as we have seen, is a sentiment that has a great deal of currency within the 
notion of material imagination. 
 
 
GASTON BACHELARD AND DAVID MACAULEY: THE ELEMENTS, THEIR PUZZLE AND 
THEIR FUTURE  
 
 The consequences of an uncritical attitude to the phenomenal world are matters of 
great interest for our other twenty-first century materialist, David Macauley. In many ways, 
Macauley is an intellectual descendent of Gaston Bachelard, a fellow advocate of elemental 
imagination as a conceptual phenomenon of enduring relevance. An increased awareness 
of the elements – a level of materiality above the inscrutable level of the atomic and below 
the unknowable vastness of the heavens – leads to a corresponding increase in our 
awareness of the force, motion, affect and ontological force of nature. Ecological 
restoration, for Macauley, is an attempt at re-story-ation, an attempt to historicise our ideas 
of nature; the origin, appearance, disappearance and rediscovery of the elements is part of 
this story (2010: 5):  
 
With some patience, fortune, and persistence, we might be able to rediscover and 
recover a deeper and more lasting connection with the elemental world and in the 
process find our place–reside in our own element or elements, with the bewildered 
and bewildering beauty everywhere around us. (Macauley 2010: 355). 
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In Elemental Philosophy, Macauley refers to Bachelard regularly and dedicates a 
section of the book to discussing his ideas. In a section entitled The Reclamation of the 
Elemental in Continental Philosophy, Bachelard is positioned as part of a broader 
elemental awareness together with names such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, 
Irigaray and many others. His attitude is, on the whole, complimentary, and clearly 
identifies Bachelard as a major figure in the discursive landscape. Macauley (2010: 295) 
describes Bachelard as the creator of “[t]he most creative articulation and sustained 
investigation of the elements in the twentieth century”. He discusses Bachelard’s dual 
scientific and poetic aspirations, claiming that they “emerge from the same deep source 
but develop along different axes”. Science tries to bypass and eliminate the force of 
metaphors, and thus science and poetry must be made complementary, two contraries in 
tandem (Macauley 2010: 295). Macauley (2010: 296) compares the Bachelardian elements 
to “the first Western Philosophers, who provide thought with pathways through powerful 
material images”. His elemental explorations are “germane […] to a broad form of cultural 
ecology that unites the material and figurative realms” (Macauley 2010: 299). Bachelard 
influences the scope and priorities of Macauley’s elemental project, and yet there are also 
possible congruencies that we can apprehend by comparing their ideas more directly. 
 In the first of these books, The Psychoanalysis of Fire (La psychanalyse du feu), 
Bachelard (1968: 1) begins with the claim that “scientific objectivity is possible only if one 
has broken first with the immediate object, if one has refused to yield to the seduction of 
the initial choice […]”. Fire is a victim of this process, for it is no longer a reality for science; 
it has been sanitised of its power as a “striking immediate object”, broken down into a 
series of scientific problems and marginalised (Bachelard 1968: 2). At a point in the 
evolution of his ideas before enshrining the intrinsic value of the pre-hermeneutic image, 
Bachelard (1968: 3) wishes to expose the manner in which our reaction to fire is “charged 
with fallacies from the past” and “[leads] us to form immediate convictions about a 
problem which really should be solved by strict measurement and experimentation”. In 
order to overcome the irrationality of our familiarity with the elements, Bachelard's book 
seeks to destroy the philias as well as the phobias surrounding our “complacent 
acceptance” of fire. This is an attitude that Macauley echoes for environmental reasons, for 
he asks: “[i]s fire in danger of becoming a cultural ember as we continue to ignore our 
awesome capacities to transfigure the planet […]?” Fire without psychology and culture, it 
seems, is simply a poorly understood, deadly weapon. 
 The next book in the sequence, Water and Dreams (L'eau et les rêves), moves away 
from attempts to exorcise the immediate object from human thought into the realm of the 
formal and material imagination. The material imagination occurs within “every poetic 
work that penetrates deeply enough into the heart of being to find the constancy and 
lovely monotony of matter,” and yet must “embrace all the exuberance of formal beauty in 
order to attract the reader in the first place” (Bachelard 2006: 2). Moving on from the 
proposition made in The Psychoanalysis of Fire that different types of imagination could 
be linked to the four classical elements, Bachelard advances  the more ambitious claim that 
“every poetics must accept components of material essence”, and that the elements are 
the best classification schema of such components (Bachelard 2006: 3). Water, within this 
system, engages in a material poetics of reflection and flow, purity and impurity, moving 
through and infusing all. Macauley (2010: 49) adds an ecological dimension to this image, 
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suggesting that “it is undoubtedly wise to adopt the environmental axiom that in a very 
real sense ‘we all live downstream’”. Material essence, then, is intrinsic to poetics and 
environmental interconnectivity in equal measure.  
 In Air and Dreams (L'air et les songes), Bachelard switches diverts his philosophy from 
the imagination of matter to that of movement. The reason for this turn, according to 
Bachelard (1988: 2) is to focus on an oft-ignored facet of imagination, the “mobility of 
images”. Movement, according to Bachelard, is the opposite of structure, and is neglected 
because “[i]t is easier to describe forms than motion”. In Air and Dreams Bachelard 
confronts an important facet of his work. He asks the reader, rhetorically, whether or not 
attempting to study a moveable and dynamic material element will be taken by the 
imagination as “justification for inflexibility and monotony” (Bachelard 1988: 7). Not so, for 
the element is “the principle of a good conductor that gives continuity to the imagining 
psyche” (Bachelard 1988: 8). This conductivity, for Macauley, is the conduit for degradation. 
“Inhaling the air of Mexico city […] on a daily basis,” he claims, “is roughly like smoking two 
packs of cigarettes a day”. Our senses, he continues, signal to us that something is afoul 
(Macauley 2010: 34). Movement, it seems, has unfortunate consequences when pollution is 
involved. 
 In the final instalment of his elemental project – a pair of instalments, in fact – 
Bachelard’s Earth and Reveries of Repose (La terre et les rêveries du repos) and Earth and 
Reveries of Will (La terre et les rêveries de la volonté) completed the tetrad. Earth, 
Bachelard (2002: 2) claims, is so familiar to us that “it is not readily apparent how dreams of 
their deepest essence are to be extracted”. The ‘repose’ and ‘will’ of the two books refer to 
an ‘extrovert’ and ‘introvert’ form of reverie, the former dreams of action, the latter dreams 
of our inner depths (Bachelard 2002: 7). Earth, for Bachelard, is characterised primarily by 
the material property of resistance, the primary ingredient in what he calls ‘the world of 
resistance’. Macauley reverses Bachelard’s reverie of repose to consider the vastness of our 
terrestrial home. Actively remembering the earth, for Macauley (2010: 25), is the path to a 
better appreciation of just how spectacular a planet, our Earth, we live on. 
 What, then, have the elements become? After 'reanimating' the history of Western 
elemental theory, Macauley (2010: 333) seeks to “rediscover – even re-enchant and recover 
– an elemental connection with the natural world and earth, fire, air and water 
particularly”. As we have seen, Bachelard’s poetics of reverie sought to do just the same 
thing, albeit in order to quash an epistemic fallacy rather than rephilosophise the 
environment. These outcomes, I propose, are not at all incompatible. Attempting to 
instrumentalise the metaphoric vocabulary of poetry while simultaneously attempting to 
instrumentalise the environment has the same effect: impoverishment and eventual death; 
death of human dreams for Bachelard, death of everything for Macauley. Mindfulness of 
the elements as uniquely powerful and relevant can do nothing but good, and the dual 
outcome of preserving environment and cultural heritage is more powerful than either 
alone. 
 The goal of elemental philosophy is political and environmental for Macauley, and 
epistemological and poetic for Bachelard. Both result in what Macauley describes as the 
be-wildering of thought: an imbuing of ontology, epistemology and social order with the 
valence of the realm beyond our own material and mental walls (Macauley 2010: 334). This 
notion has strong resonances with Bachelard’s assertions that interaction with an 
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elemental image says more about us than it does about the image. Both philosophers seek 
to open up the world of the elements to consideration and rehabilitation with different 
goals, and yet merge to become more nuanced and profound. 
 
 
A VIBRANT BACHELARD?  
 
 Although separated by years, disciplines, preoccupations and methodologies, the 
work of Gaston Bachelard and Jane Bennett touches upon the same subject: the power of 
matter to exert influence over the human subject, to be dynamic. Furthermore, both 
philosophers present a world in which arbitrary delineations such as subject and object of 
vitality and inertness are untenable. Both see matter as an inherently captivating entity 
with the power to hold and shape human affect and imagination. Both place natural 
vitality in a pivotal role in the human perception of and interaction with the world. When 
placed together, Bennett and Bachelard complement each other in a fashion that is 
mutually supportive and critically engaging. How, then, does Gaston Bachelard compare to 
the philosophy laid out in Vibrant Matter, and what can we learn from such a comparison? 
 The point of most fruitful comparisons between these two subjectivities is, to my 
mind, to feel the object as Bennett does, but to interpret the object as Bachelard does. By 
adding the embodied dimension of Merleau-Ponty to phenomenology, I propose that we 
gain a felt as well as imagined poetics of vital matter. The argument has already been put 
forward (Saint Aubert 2006) for a dialogue between the approaches of Merleau-Ponty and 
Bachelard in a dialectic relationship, and yet through Bennett, the two can merge and 
become a hybrid entity.  
 Bachelard presents a rigorous and practical approach to material imagination and 
reverie, and yet this approach can be expanded into the realms of embodiment and 
politics. By presenting a Bennet–Bachelard methodological admixture, we glimpse a world 
in which we can focus on and feel the vital agency of matter, are co-constituted with it 
both bodily and phenomenologically, divide its power from that of so-called ‘objective’ 
knowings of the world and can re-imagine ourselves and our poetics in a politically active, 
engaged fashion. Bachelard discusses the non-embodied ‘interworld’ at great depths, but 
with Bennett’s more corporeal phenomenology, we can propose a poetics and reverie of 
matter within as well as without us, entangled with our biology and daily life as well as our 
imagination.  
 Bachelard posited that scientific and poetic knowledge could not be compatible, and 
yet we find ourselves in an interesting situation; the advancement of ‘objective’ scientific 
knowledge has furnished us with atoms, DNA, cells, protons, all of the invisible objects of 
matter. With a rich new understanding of the life that surrounds us, is it not possible that 
the material imagination and science can merge to inspire reveries undreamt of even in 
Bachelard’s lifetime? His ideas are, inevitably, going to present a ‘philosophy of access’: 
they are empirical and not speculative. And yet within his grappling with the impossibility 
of objectivity, we see a kind of ur-speculative realism emerge. I propose that a more 
vibrant materialist Bachelard, in dialogue with the more networked and object-oriented 
philosophies of the last twenty years, need not deal in archetypes or singularities. 
Bachelard proposed that “only phenomenology – that is to say, consideration of the onset 
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of the image in an individual consciousness – can help us to restore the subjectivity of 
images and to measure their fullness, their strength, and their trans-subjectivity” 
(Bachelard 1997: XIX). It seems that this claim is only one step in a cycle, for a close reading 
of Bennett implies that the ‘onset’ of an image is equally effective even when that image is 
of something phenomenal on a different scale: a bacterium through a microscope, or an 
astronomer’s image of a distant nebula. 
 The ‘language’ of matter has grown, the ‘adjectives’ have multiplied: material 
imagery is now far greater in scope than it was in a traditionally Bachelardian sense, and 
the perception of this image is tied in with an endless Deleuzian web of correspondences. 
A new, vital materialist, Bachelard would adapt to such an environment, and yet his core 
precepts need little modification. By applying this new Bachelard to twenty-first century 
problems, perhaps we can approach new political and ecological imaginings undreamt of 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
 The twenty-first century has been gifted with a vision of the power and dynamism of 
objects in Bachelard’s philosophy of matter coupled with a methodology for reading the 
subjective states induced by this dynamism. He is by no means a politically motivated 
philosopher, and Bennett is not primarily preoccupied with the mechanics of subjectivity, 
yet each imply – either explicitly or in potentia – the possibility and even desirability a 
theory of material imagination that both illuminates the human trans-subjective 
imagination, politicises the implications of these imaginings, and enables a reverie that 
goes deeper and works on a greater spectrum than before.  
 
 
AN ENVIRONMENTAL BACHELARD?  
 
 The elements, for Macauley, are the “shock of the real” that allow us to “see again for 
a spell the way children perceive the universe as brimming with marvels” (Macauley 2010: 
354). Elements, as well as being our daily companions, are equally catalytic forces that 
shock us into engaging with “an ancient, sometimes strange but also strangely familiar and 
certainly more capacious sphere that we cannot easily assimilate” (Macauley 2010: 354). 
Bachelard’s whole elemental project (1968) stemmed from his puzzlement over magical 
thinking about and un-scientific engagement with fire. Could it be that a revisitation of 
Bachelard’s elemental theory, and a consideration of Macauley’s philosophy in the light of 
Bachelard, could enrich our understanding not only of each respective philosopher, but 
also of the elements themselves? This comparison is fascinating, for it adapts Bachelard 
into a role that did not formally exist during his lifetime, that of an environmentalist. Is it 
even possible for a philosopher who died before the environmental movement began to 
be an environmentalist? Not, it seems, if that philosopher is Gaston Bachelard. 
 Bachelard’s ‘proto-environmentalism’ emerges in synthesis with Macauley. The 
wonder of childhood, Bachelard proposes (1971: 99), is the fuel for reverie, for “the child 
knows the happiness of dreaming that will later be the happiness of the poets”. For 
Macauley, it is this imagination that will recuperate our environmental awareness. This 
sentiment, to my mind, is perhaps the most Bachelardian resonance in Macauley’s book. By 
becoming so preoccupied with the objective, inert and instrumental traits of matter, we 
have surrendered our childlike affinity for material imagination in favour for a colder, more 
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ecologically harmful putative maturity. By shocking the imagination into an engagement 
with the elements, Macauley proposes a move away from a world in which we are 
“increasingly sheltered from rather than brought into closer contact with the elements, 
which, in turn, have retreated from the forefront of daily thought and experience” 
(Macauley 2010: 1). A more ‘environmental’ Bachelard implies, worryingly, that sheltering 
ourselves from the outside world stifles our future potential for poetry in equal measure. 
 Bachelard, in my formulation, has become an environmentalist post facto. It is a 
strange coincidence that the publication of Rachael Carson's Silent Spring on September 
the 27th, 1962, preceded the passing away of Bachelard in Paris on October the 16th by so 
short a span. What would he have thought of Carson’s book, generally considered to be a 
key catalyst for the environmental movement, had he lived to read it? What kind of 
material imagination would be possible in a landscape ravaged by pesticides? What kind of 
reverie would be possible in a body of water in which no fish swam, in which no life could 
thrive? Macauley, I think, offers some clues as to how best to inflect Bachelard with 
environmentalism. The environmental task that began so close to his departure from the 
world allows Bachelard to ‘live’ again, for his ideas now transcend his life. If Henry David 
Thoreau can be cast as a proto-ecologist and object of interest for ecocritics, then why not 
Bachelard? 
 The strength of the elements as a framework for environmental consciousness, 
Macauley argues, simultaneously satisfies anthropocentric, biocentric and eco-centric 
criteria. Anthropocentric, because the elements are tied to our material needs, and we 
must keep them pure and intact in order to sustain ourselves. Biocentric because the 
elements nurture and sustain the vast biosphere of the Earth, an order inextricably 
enmeshed with humanity. Eco-centric because the composition of what we call the 
‘environment’ through the combined elements fosters a place-based ethic within which 
landscape is diverse and localised rather than abstract and generalised (Macauley 2010: 
335–6). Bachelard, a good Husserlian, is anthropocentric and arguably androcentric 
(O’Shea-Meddour 2003), and yet has great potential within the realm of the biocentric and 
ecocentric. An eco-centric Bachelard, in particular, would allow more localisation and 
variation to colour the material imagination. Could an environmental Bachelard expand 
into a new diversity by escaping a predominantly European and essentialist view of 
matter?  
 
 
THE FUTURE BACHELARD?  
 
 In conclusion, I would like to return to the notion of autopoesis. Bachelard, through 
the course of this essay, has been exposed to comparisons that highlight three major 
points. First, Bachelard is truly distinct and unique, and continues to be a relevant object of 
study in his own right. Second, Gaston Bachelard, Jane Bennett and David Macauley have 
many ideas in common that provide the basis for new comparisons between materialisms 
old and new. Third, a ‘new Bachelard’ emerges from the synthesis of ideas, his ideas 
engaged with a more diffuse, more complex, network of material images, an ecological 
awareness and an ethic of conservation. What future self-generating manifestations might 
his ideas take? What can we learn by allowing this process to occur for other thinkers in 
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other contexts? If the ideas of other great historical philosophers are received and 
reinvented for their time, then why not Gaston Bachelard? His legacy of ideas is rich, their 
applicability ever validated, and their popularity undiminished. We have glimpsed a 
vibrant materialist Bachelard and an environmental Bachelard. What further potentialities 
remain untapped within the corpus of his work? 
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